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Executive Registry

74-4819

13 September 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Cuban Exile

25X1 I saw [redacted] a Cuban exile at the [redacted]  
[redacted]. We spoke alone in Spanish.

He recounted his past as an opponent of both Castro and military regimes (presumably Batista's) in Cuba. He said that after leaving Cuba he had travelled a great deal around Latin America drumming up support for a military effort by Cuban exiles against the Castro regime. He indicated that he had had close relations with [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] on this subject and both had promised assistance. Suddenly and for reasons he did not know both had withdrawn their support around February 1973. The

25X1 [redacted] refused to receive him further and the [redacted] had told him that the whole matter was in suspense. Since then he had heard nothing further and Jose de la Torriente, the leader of the military side of the Cuban exile movement, had been mysteriously killed in Miami. I asked [redacted] if he had any indication who had killed Torriente and he said that he did not but deduced that Torriente's death would mostly benefit Castro and presumed that the latter had directed Torriente's execution.

25X1 [redacted] then said that he had found a good home in the U.S. and that there was a grave development taking place in the Cuban exile community in the U.S. which concerned him very much. This was that a group of Cubans advocating violence and direct action was gradually gaining control of the Cuban community in the United States and that they feared that the U.S. would go along with lifting the sanctions against Castro's Cuba and might even make a deal with it. If this happened, he was fearful that the Cubans in the U.S. might resort to violence and breaking American laws. This he would greatly deplore as he was most grateful for the second

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home the U. S. had given him. However, the Cuban community was increasingly convinced that the U.S. was about to make some move towards rapprochement with Cuba and would certainly blame Dr. Kissinger for this. Already they were saying he was soft on Communists.

25X1 I told [ ] that I hoped these counsels of violence would not be heard. These Cubans had been made welcome in the United States and if anyone told him Dr. Kissinger was soft on Communists, I could tell him from personal knowledge that this was definitely not true.

25X1 It was not totally clear to me whether [ ] was connecting the Cuban frustration and growing propensity for violence with Dr. Kissinger's person. In any case, he thanked me for my reassurance that Dr. Kissinger was not soft on anyone and left.

25X1

[ ]

Vernon A. Walters  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

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25X1

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